This shocking admission should come as no surprise. The primary reason for the insurgency’s “regenerative” power is the violent military occupation itself. To admit that the occupation is the cause of violence would create overwhelming pressure for a withdrawal.
The 122-page biannual Pentagon report reveals a comprehensive strategy of counterinsurgency, one at complete variance with the Obama administration’s narrower policy of disrupting, derailing and defeating al Qaeda. The Pentagon plan, developed by outgoing U.S. General David Petraeus, includes an ambitious expansion of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), but also to reduce corruption and criminality, develop good governance, a modern judiciary, highways, mining, agriculture, and improve the status of women and children.
The document extends the length of the proposed American withdrawal from combat until the end of 2014, despite repeated assertions by Gen. Petraeus that the al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan remains at “less than 100 or so.” The Pentagon has since recommended an initial drawdown of only a token 5,000 U.S. troops in July, potentially to be followed by the removal of an additional 5,000 military personnel through the end of 2011. These numbers fail to reduce U.S. troop commitments below 2009 pre-surge totals.
In the meantime, the Pentagon proposes that the ANA, ANP, and Afghan government assume authority in seven geographic “areas of transition,” home to 25 percent of the country’s population, starting as soon as this summer. The seven areas are parts of Kabul, Panjshir, and Bamyan provinces, and the municipal districts of Mazar-e-Sharif, Lashkar Gah, Herat, and Mehtar Lam. The enclaves roughly approximate the lines of the civil war fought between the Taliban and Northern Alliance a decade ago.
The Pentagon report ignores evidence that the Afghan security forces being built and trained are sectarian in nature, mentioning only in passing problems of achieving "ethnic balance." According to Foreign Policy, even ethnic recruiting goals ignore "the socio-political and historical realities of Afghanistan." Early forces were "heavily recruited out of Tajik Northern Alliance formations," resulting in an overrepresentation of Tajik commanders within the ANA. According to a UN official in the spring of 2008, representing only 25 percent of the population, 70 percent of all kandak (battalion) commanders were Tajiks, a "stark contrast" to the pre-war composition of the Afghan army. The new Pentagon report cites only 200 Pashtun recruits per month this year, without describing their status.
As evidence suggests that the Taliban insurgency has significantly grown, only 700 Taliban have been “reintegrated” under the government’s pacification program. And amid Pentagon claims of "tangible progress," the so-called “total security incidents” were approximately the same in the Oct 2010-Mar. 2011 period as in the previous one of 2009-2010.
 “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, April 2011.” Department of Defense, April 13, 2011, Page 56. http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf.
 Ibid. Page 50.
 Testimony of General David Petraeus before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, March 2011; and, Deb Riechmann. "Petraeus: Al-Qaida Is Not On Rise in Afghanistan." Associated Press, April 10, 2011.
 Barnes, Julain E., and Adam Entous. "Military Draws Up Afghan Exit Plan." The Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2011.
 These “areas of transition” were publicly announced by Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai on March 22, 2011. Nordland, Rod and Ray Rivera. “Afghans to Take Over Security in 7 Areas, Mostly Peaceful, by July.” The New York Times, March 23, 2011. Page A4.
 Department of Defense. Page 25.
 DuPee, Matthew, and Thomas Johnson. "Transition to nowhere: The limits of "Afghanization"" Foreign Policy. March 22, 2011.
 Cordesman, Anthony H., Adam Mausner, and David Kasten. "Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces." Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Page 72.
 Giustozzi, Dr. Antonio. "Afghanistan's National Army: The Ambiguous Prospects of Afghanization." Terrorism Monitor, Volume:6 Issue: 9, May 1, 2008.
 Porter, Gareth. "Deferring to Petraeus, NIE Failed to Register Taliban Growth." Inter Press Service, February 14, 2011.
 Department of Defense. Page 3.
 Shanker, Thom. "Afghanistan War Report Cites Progress by Troops." The New York Times, April 30, 2011. Page A9.
 Security incidents include direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, and IED events. IED events include IED explosions, IEDs that were found and cleared, mine explosions, and mines that were found and cleared.